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ABSTRACT 
 
SQL Injections are still a prominent threat on the web.  Using a custom built 
tool, BlindCanSeeQL (BCSQL), we will explore how to automate Blind SQL attacks 
to discover database schema using fewer requests than the standard methods, thus 
helping avoid detection from overloading a server with hits.  This tool uses a web 
crawler to discover keywords that assist with autocompleting schema object names, 
along with improvements in ASCII bisection to lower the number of requests sent to 
the server.  Along with this tool, we will discuss ways to prevent and protect 
against such attacks. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  SQL Injection Overview 
 SQL Injections are not a new attack vector for discovering data, surpassing 
authentication information, or even gaining control of a system, yet they are still a 
prominent means to compromise a system and the data within. [2-4] SQL 
Injections refer to the insertion or injection of extra information of a SQL query, 
typically from input data from a client to the server into a poorly validated 
application, which will execute the code.  Most commonly this means a web page 
that dynamically displays content or updates the SQL database in some way, but 
could also be used to refer any client/server type application.  Since the most 
common SQL Injection attacks occur through the web, it will be the focus of this 
paper. 
 A typical attack through a web application is often done in the query string.  
However, any type of input may be used to compromise the system, such as 
header data, POST data, cookies, referrer URLs, user-agent, and more, if the 
system uses any of these to read or write to the SQL database.  By appending data 
to the end of one of these input vectors, one may see a change in the page’s 
behavior.  For instance, if the database powering a website is Microsoft’s SQL 
Server, appending a single quote to the end of the website’s URL and query string 
could cause an error message to appear. 
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As an example, a website that displays product data might pull up a product 
page for product number seven using the “id” parameter in the following query 
string: http://www.somesite.com/target/target.asp?id=7.  If the data is not 
validated and errors are visible, appending a single quote causes the message in 
Figure 1 to appear: http://www.somesite.com/target/target.asp?id=7’  This is a 
classic example of SQL Injection in web applications. [5] 
 
Figure 1:  Visible Error Based Attack.  This figure shows a visible error message 
that would result from using an unclosed quotation.  
 
1.2  Classifications and Techniques for SQL Injection 
SQL Injections come in many variations and flavors.  According to Open Web 
Application Security Project (further referenced as OWASP), there are three classes 
of SQL Injection Attacks: [5] 
1. In-band:  data is visible in the same channel used for the injection. 
2. Out-of-band:  data is retrieved outside of the band used for the injection. 
3. Inferential or Blind:  no data is visible or transferred.  However, the 
attacker is able to determine the data by observing behavior changes. 
For obvious reasons, In-band attacks make it easy to reconstruct how the 
query within the code works (for instance, many Cold Fusion sites show the entire 
query).  If no error message is shown, it is still possible for an attacker to reverse 
engineer the logic behind the scenes, and many automated tools exist to exploit 
this. 
3 
 
Within these three classes, five common techniques are used to glean 
information from the database [5]: 
1. Union:  appending data using the UNION operator. 
2. Boolean:  determining data through true/false conditions. 
3. Error:  visible error data, which can include query logic, data, and more. 
4. Out-of-band:  uses a different channel to display information. 
5. Time Delay:  cause the server to delay or sleep in a conditional query 
(most useful when none of the other methods provide results). 
Attacks can be combinations of the above techniques; such as using the 
UNION operator to force Error based data over an Out-of-band connection.  I would 
also like to mention another technique, although not defined by OWASP in the 
common techniques.  Stacked Queries, which are done by putting multiple queries 
within the injection, allow the attacker to execute multiple queries in one call.  An 
example of a stacked query could be “(background query)’; INSERT INTO users 
(username, password, IsAdmin) values (‘attacker’,’password’, 1);--‘“.  This would 
hijack the query to insert the user as a valid admin user, provided that the table 
names and column data types are correctly used.  It should be noted that MySQL 
does not allow more than one query within a call, providing protection against this 
type of attack (Oracle and MS SQL allow stacked queries). 
If a detailed visible error message is shown, it is extremely easy to get the 
database schema and data.  Most sites now protect against visual error based 
attacks, often with a redirect to a generic error page.  There are many SQL 
injection utilities that already take advantage of this, so Error based attacks will not 
be covered during this discussion.  
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 One might also be able to have a page display data using a UNION attack.  
By doing a UNION command, one appends the data to the result set, which then 
gets displayed on the page.  While not as convenient as a direct error message 
result, this is a very convenient way to get data out of the database, or even other 
sensitive system data if the database has access to the file system or other systems 
on the network.  Again, there are many tools out there for gathering visible data, 
and will not be covered in this paper. 
Out-of band attacks are both visible and blind, meaning that you cannot see 
the data In-Band (thus is blind In-band) but sends the data to a remote server 
(thus is visible In-band).  Out-of band uses specific database commands, such as 
OPENROWSET in MSSQL or UTL_HTTP in Oracle, to send data through another 
channel.  This technique can use any non-hardened vector, such as FTP, DNS, HTTP, 
or other protocols that may not be blocked.  This requires one to setup and have 
control of another system that the database server can connect to, along with 
timestamps or other ordering data since the responses can come out of sequence.  
Since most servers and firewalls do not block DNS requests this becomes a viable 
option to sending data from the system to an outside source.  This type of attack is 
not discussed in this paper. 
Even if a visible data response isn’t shown, an attacker can take advantage 
of the system using Blind SQL Injection Attacks.  One of those techniques is a time-
delay attack using built in database commands (e.g. sleep) that cause a delay in 
the response of the page.  However, since other criteria may also cause a delay, 
such as website or network traffic, this should be the last attack vector to use.  It is 
not covered in this discussion either. 
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The final blind attack technique is the Boolean technique.  By watching the 
behavior of the application, an attacker is able to reconstruct information by 
sending particular requests and observing the behavior of the application and the 
database responses.  This attack uses Boolean conditions to determine if the data is 
true or false.  Think of it as playing Twenty Questions with the server, typically 
checking the ASCII byte value of a single character in the position of the output.  
While tedious, this type of attack is still one of the most common.  Developers tend 
to think that because you don’t see an error, the database is secure.  This paper 
will focus on this Boolean style of attack, providing a tool that uses fewer requests 
to determine DB Schema objects. 
1.3  Summary of Discussion and Contribution 
 The work in this thesis is based on .NET (ASPX) and ASP websites utilizing a 
Microsoft SQL (MSSQL) backend.  Both are readily available tools from Microsoft 
and represent the largest installed base of URLs.  According to WhiteHat Security, 
ASPX and ASP total 44% of URLs by language.  [6] 
Java, PHP, and other languages can connect to MS SQL (as well as .NET and 
ASP sites connecting to other database (DB) servers such as MySQL and Oracle), 
but common practice is to use the same DB server vendor as the web site vendor.  
With Microsoft technologies being the most widely used, and holding the most 
combined SQL Injection vulnerability, the decision was made to utilize these 
technologies in development and testing of this thesis. 
Many tools exist to automate blind SQL injection, including new tools using 
threading to gather data quickly.  All of the tools for blind injections find data by 
each character.  The downside to this volume of queries is that the attack is highly 
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visible as the number of requests to a website jumps dramatically.  An admin or 
security device might notice a large jump in the number of requests based on the 
use of such a tool.  A small database with seven tables and 32 columns could take 
several thousands of requests to determine the schema, and many more than that 
if using threading, because threading requires the length of each database object to 
be known in advance. 
It is common practice for programmers to use the same table and column 
names from the database in the website forms and fields when developing a web 
application that connects to a database server.  By building a tool that would 
intelligently discover a dictionary of key words from a website, one could shorten 
the number of requests to a server by autocompleting database schema objects 
utilizing these key words.  This could help skip detection triggered by an unsual 
volume of requests by both slowing down how quickly it sends the requests, and at 
the same time lowering the number of requests required to determine the schema.  
This is a framework discovery tool; the tool is not efficient for retrieving data 
contained within the columns, but instead would return the schema, which the user 
can then look over for important columns.  For instance, one would most likely 
want to know which tables contain username and password information, but would 
want to ignore tables with tax information or product weights.  
This thesis will cover related work and formal definitions in Chapter 2, as well 
as a list of some of the current automated tools.  Chapter 3 will focus on current, 
in-use blind injection techniques.  In Chapter 4, I will discuss the tool I wrote, 
BlindCanSeeQL, which automatically crawls a website and grabs any input or form 
field IDs to build a dictionary file.  It then uses a previously discovered blind 
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injection point and special bisection rules along with the predictive dictionary to 
exploit DB schema discovery at a more efficient hit rate than other current 
automated tools.  The improvements will be discussed and compared against one of 
the most popular tools, SQLMAP. [7]  Chapter 5 will discuss ways to prevent such 
attacks, and draw final conclusions on the topic. 
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK 
 
This chapter discusses other research related to this thesis.  SQL Injection 
Attacks, or SQLIAs, have been formally defined in previous work, including 
classification, detection tools, and prevention.  [8-12]  While a majority of attacks 
are on the web, due to the prevalence of websites being database driven 
applications that anyone with a browser might have access to, it should be noted 
that this could apply to any database driven application.  For instance, there has 
been analysis of utilizing SQLite attack vectors in Android OS as a possible way to 
gain control of a system. [13]   
Considering the existence of disassemblers and live debuggers, such as IDA 
Pro, one should not assume that a carefully coded client software is sending 
validated data to a server side application.  [14]  It is possible to decompile a 
desktop client application, or alter outgoing traffic to a server at the network level, 
and send additional data that would be accepted at the security level of the server 
application.  Therefore, validation should be performed at both the client and the 
server level.  For instance, GreyWolf is a reverse engineering tool for .NET 
Framework application that can de-obfuscate and edit the common language 
runtime, adding payloads or editing attributes. [15] 
SQLIAs are more specifically defined by Donald Ray and Jay Ligatti as “code-
injection attacks on outputs”, or CIAOs.  [16-17]  This definition is well suited for 
this thesis as the focus is Boolean based blind SQL injections, in which the output of 
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the program is different based on the data passed to the server.  CIAOs will be 
discussed in section 2.2. 
2.1  SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIAs)  
The general definition of SQLIAs is when an attacker changes the intended 
logic of a SQL query by inserting new data, whether that is SQL keywords, data, 
operators, or non-code injections. [10]  This can be a first-order injection, which 
directly trigger the SQLIA, or second-order injection, in which the data is saved to 
the database to be triggered at later time.  [11]  For instance, a website might 
allow a new user to be created, parsing the input correctly and saving it to the 
database using an INSERT function.  In another part of the application that data 
might be retrieved to do an UPDATE function that is not validated correctly, causing 
the second-order injection to occur. 
While many SQLIA types are defined [8-12], the one that this paper focuses 
on is known as Inference, or Blind Injections.  As discussed in chapter one, errors 
may be hidden from the user, but the output of the application changes based on 
the input.  By using true/false questions about the data values, typically character 
by character, attackers can extract data from the database. 
Although some researchers suggest that parameterized statements, least 
privilege, or stored procedures can defend against these attacks [19-20], one 
should not rely on these alone.  Incorrectly written stored procedures that call 
dynamically built SQL would still be vulnerable to SQLIAs.  [12]  Techniques like 
character encoding might bypass parameterized statements if not validated, and 
while least privilege might protect against a first-order injection, it may not protect 
against a second-order injection, if the code that runs against the data written by 
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the least privilege user has different privilege.  For instance, a reporting tool might 
be run as a site administrator, and in that report it might grab and execute a SQLIA 
unknown to the user running the report. 
Many SQLIA detection methods and frameworks have been discussed in 
other works [18].  SQLIA countermeasures exist, such as AMNESIA [21],  CANDID 
[22], and SQLCHECK [23].  However, none of these are catch-all and should be 
combined with manual and automated approaches, such as defensive programming, 
code reviews, and scanning frameworks. 
2.2  Code-Injection Attacks on Outputs (CIAOs) 
 In more recent work, it has been shown that the formal existing definitions of 
code-injection attacks, of which SQLIA is part of, is lacking.  The work by Donald 
Ray and Jay Ligatti [16-17] distinguishes between “code-injection attacks” (CIAs) 
and “code-injection attacks on outputs” (CIAOs).  CIAs are used to define code 
injected into memory used by an application, while CIAOs are on outputs.  By 
separating and formalizing the definitions, it allows us to more effectively develop 
and analyze CIAOs. 
 That work has been further expanded with the discussion of BroNIEs, or 
Broken Non-code Insertion or Expansions.  [25]  Similar to parameterized queries, 
in which placeholders are manually used for untrusted inputs, BroNIEs looks to 
automatically fill all untrusted inputs to be confined to non-code.  Considering all 
applications that are vulnerable to CIAOs are also vulnerable to BroNIEs, tools could 
be developed to help stop attacks without requiring developer compliance such as 
defensive programming. 
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2.3  Existing Automated Tools for SQL Injection 
 Doing SQL Injection testing by hand can take a great deal of work.  Luckily, 
there are quite a few automated tools out there.  Not all tools are created equal, 
and some generate many unnecessary requests.  EFYTimes.com lists ten of the 
most powerful tools as of March 2014 [26]: 
• BSQL Hacker (MySQL support is in beta) 
• The Mole (Union or Boolean only) 
• Pangolin (developed by NOSEC) 
• SQLMAP (Python code base, endorsed by OWASP, has the most functions) 
• Havij  
• Enema SQLi 
• SQLNinja (focuses on Microsoft SQL Server) 
• Sqlsus (Perl based tool for MySQL) 
• Safe3 SQL Injector 
• SQL Poizon 
There are many more tools than those listed here (Absinthe, SQL Power 
Injector, and Acunetix to name a few).  I chose to test against SQLMAP because it 
is free and open source, and is known for its full support for all SQL injection 
techniques on eleven major database management systems [7].  SQLMAP has been 
used in other research papers [27-28] as the main tool to compare results against. 
When using SQLMAP, I forced the technique to be Boolean based, and 
flushed each session and used fresh queries.  By default, SQLMAP stores session 
data so that it does not have to retrieve already known data.  SQLMAP also has 
some great features such as searching for specific strings within database names, 
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tables, and columns.  For instance, it can identify tables and columns that contain 
the string “name” or “pass”, without having to grab the entire schema. 
SQLMAP schema detection sorts by sysuser.name+’.’+sysobjects name for 
tables, skipping the need to read table owners separately.  By sorting this way, it 
can check the current table owner name and characters of the previous table, 
starting with the first character of the last known table owner.  For the default 
owner, “dbo.”, it will do a test for “d” then “b” then “o” then “.”.  Suppose you have 
“dbo.Product” then “dbo.ProductVariant” in sort order.  On the second table, it 
would find the first 12 characters (dbo.Product) using 12 requests, and start testing 
on the 13th character.  This saves quite a few requests.  It also sorts columns by 
name, but doesn’t seem to do any checks from the previous column data like it 
does for tables.    
2.4  Related Work Summary 
 SQLIAs have been generally defined, and further defined into CIAOs for this 
paper.  These definitions help create detection frameworks and countermeasures 
for SQL injections, with references to existing tools for both attacking and 
protecting against such attacks. 
 Ideally, server side code needs both defensive programming and automated 
testing utilities to recognize attacks.  This can be strengthened through the use of 
frameworks and countermeasures created by the definitions of SQLIAs and CIAOs. 
 It is important to remember that this applies to all database driven 
applications, not only web based applications, as the client side may not be as 
secure as one would believe.   
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CHAPTER 3: BLIND SQL INJECTION 
 
3.1  Anatomy of the Blind SQL Injection Technique 
 SQL Injection of any type requires an input of some sort: query string, form 
field, HTTP header (e.g. cookies), and more.  When this is passed to an application 
that does not sanitize inputs, the attacker can execute unintended commands or 
access data they normally would not be given access to. 
For instance, the backend code for a SQL query might be something like this: 
SELECT ProductName, ProductDescription FROM Products WHERE ProdID = 1 
In this example, “SELECT ProductName, ProductDescription FROM Products WHERE 
ProdID =” is the query, and “1” is the data.  The web application gets the data from 
the URL, e.g. http://samplesite.com/info.asp?pid=1, where 
“http://samplesite.com/info.asp?pid=” is the resource, and “1” is the data.  An 
example of a vulnerable code behind could be: 
String query = “SELECT ProductName, ProductDescription FROM Products WHERE 
ProdID = ” + request.getParameter(“pid”); 
 By manipulating that data part of the URL we can add on to the query being 
passed to the database.  It is becoming more and more common for developers to 
hide any errors (e.g. Try{} Catch{} statements, or error page redirects).  But what 
about when a query is valid?  This is where Blind SQL Injections come into play. 
 If we were to change the data part of the URL to “1 and 1=1”, which is a true 
statement, the query is still valid and therefore would return the same page content 
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as sending “1”.  Changing the data to “1 and 1=2” makes the query false.  If the 
content of the true and false pages are different, then the attacker is able to do a 
Blind SQL Injection, as seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2:  Example of True and False Blind SQL Injection.  The query on the left is 
false (“and 1=2”), while the query on the right is true (“ and 1=1”).  Since the right 
query is true, it displays content normally. 
 
 Since we can now start asking the server true and false questions, we can 
find out the values of data, character by character.  It would be both time and 
request intensive to check each position against each possible value, so attackers 
typically convert the character to its ASCII value and perform bisection queries to 
reduce the number of requests to find each character.  Once the first character is 
discovered, we move on to the next, until we reach the end. 
3.2  Using Bisection 
 Blind SQL Injection is done one character at a time.  In an ideal world, tables 
and columns would consist only of letters.  One would then define the set or range 
of characters to be [A-Z], or 26 characters, not including lower case.  Instead of 
checking a position in a string against each character (in which case Xylophone 
would take quite a while if we started at A, then B, etc., for each character), we 
bisect the list into two lists.  We can then ask the server “is the first character in 
[A-M]”?  If the page displays the same content as a false query (e.g. 1=2 did not 
return the product name of Playstation in Figure 2), then we know the first 
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character is in the set [N-Z].  We split the set in two each time until we are left with 
one character, which is the answer.  This is bisection of sets, taking a set of size n 
and making two sets, each of size n/2. 
 Therefore the number of steps it takes to find the answer using bisection is 
log2 N, where N is the size of the set.  For upper case letters, this would mean we 
could find the answer within five requests (log2 26 = 4.7, round up to 5).  Typically 
most automated utilities consistently ask “is it greater than” until one character is 
left in the set. 
 There are two ways to know when to stop asking for the next character.  One 
way would be to first find the length of the object name, but typically this approach 
is not used, as it generates an unknown amount of requests, depending on the 
length of the string.  Other tools check for a NULL character instead, so the NULL 
character would add one more character within a set.  If the set A is all upper case 
alpha characters, adding a NULL character makes the set size 27, log2 27 = 4.75, 
which is trivial and nearly the same as a set of 26. 
  Since database objects can contain characters such as numbers, spaces, and 
other special characters, we use the ASCII character value when bisecting.  Since 
there are 128 characters in the ASCII set, this means the worst-case scenario to 
find the value is seven requests (log2 128 = 7).  Since NULL is included in the ASCII 
table, it should be found within the seven requests. 
 In order for character checking, the database must allow for SUBSTRING and 
ASCII conversion.  If determining length, a LENGTH function must exist – this is 
especially true in multithreaded automated tools to intelligently retrieve data.  It is 
also useful to have conversions functions, such as CAST, which allow you to change 
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one output type to another.  Doing a COUNT(name) for number of tables and using 
CAST to change it to a string, then finding the numbers by each character, is a lot 
more efficient than asking the server COUNT(name)=0, then COUNT(name)=1, etc.  
For instance, a database with 149 tables, “149” can be found in as little as 13 
requests by treating it like a string. 
 Practically every database has some variation of SUBSTRING, ASCII, and 
LENGTH functions, as shown in Table 1.  These functions are critical in every 
automated tool for SQLIAs.   
Table 1:  Required Database Functions.  Although BlindCanSeeQL works without 
determining the length of the text, it uses LENGTH to perform sort order of objects. 
Function Name Function Definition 
SUBSTRING(text, 
start, length) 
This function returns a portion of the “text”, with the position 
starting at the value for “start” and length of “length”.  Typical 
use of length is 1, which provides a single character. 
ASCII(character) Returns the ASCII (decimal) value of the given character 
LENGTH(text) Returns the length of the text 
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CHAPTER 4: BLINDCANSEEQL – BCSQL – BLIND INJECTION TOOL 
 
 BlindCanSeeQL (BCSQL) was developed in C# using Visual Studio 2012, .NET 
Framework 4.5.1.  It utilizes the open source Abot C# Web Crawler package [29] 
available through NuGet, a package manager for Visual Studio.  BCSQL specifically 
targets Boolean based injections for MS SQL Server, although it could be adapted to 
work with other databases in the future.  It features a web crawler that builds a 
dictionary file out of HTML input tags, which is then used for autocompleting words 
during blind injection.  A non-autocomplete injection option exists as well, to be 
used as a baseline against autocomplete queries, although it does autocomplete the 
owner name so that we can compare it SQLMAP’s performance. 
4.1  Web Crawler 
 The web crawler functionality of BCSQL has the low level plumbing handled 
by Abot (multithreading, link parsing, etc.).  This includes all open source 
dependencies such as AutoMapper, CsQuery, HtmlAgilityPack, log4net, Moq, nUnit, 
and Robots. [29] 
Log4Net [30] is used to write out a text log file and the console display.  
Log4Net allows different levels of logging (Debug, Info, Warn, Error, etc.), which 
can be set in the app.config file for the executable.  Debug will show payloads and 
low-level messages, while Info displays the current table and column being fetched.  
It is recommended to run at Info level, which shows the levels above as well 
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(warning and errors).  Log4Net was also used throughout the entire project, not 
just the web crawler. 
 CsQuery, which is also part of the Abot package, is a complete CSS selector 
engine, HTML parser, and jQuery port for C# [31].  It is utilized to scrub the page 
for input tags of type “text”, “hidden”, and “password”.  The ID field of the input 
tag is then passed into a CleanUpInput function, which removes ASP.NET system 
variables, ClientState variables, ID’s that are numbers only, and any starting text 
declared in the app.config file (e.g. “txt,popup” in the app.config would change 
txtFirstName to FirstName, popupImageURL to ImageURL, and so on).  The cleaned 
ID is then put into a SortedSet object, a .NET object which sorts alphabetically and 
does not allow duplicate elements.   
 From the sorted set a dictionary file is built, using the path and filename 
defined in the app.config.  This file is loaded (or created if it does not exist) every 
time the program runs, and then saved when the program ends. 
4.2  BCSQL DB Class Design 
 BCSQL is an object oriented console application that utilizes a custom built 
class called DB, which mimics database structures.  The DB class object contains 
Table objects, which contain Column objects.  A tracking object, called 
BisectionOutput, is used for any requests made, whether it a request for an 
autocomplete, or the set of requests of the ASCII byte order used to find the 
current character.  This object allows for the history tracking and statistics, 
including number of requests made, if an autocomplete guess made, and if it 
correct or not.  Each set of objects contains various tracking objects, automatically 
generated from the BisectionOutput data, as listed in the table 2. 
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Table 2:  BCSQL Statistical Methods By Object.  These statistics are generated by 
parsing the BiscetionOutput objects that are related to main object in the Object 
column.  All statistical objects listed are of type integer.  
Object  Statistical Method Name Description 
DB TotalRequests Total requests for schema 
discovery (does not include initial 
blind injection test). 
TotalGuessesColumnInDB Number of all autocomplete 
attempts made (column names). 
TotalGoodGuessesColumnsInDB Number of all correct 
autocompletes (column names). 
TotalGuessesTableNamesInDB Number of all autocomplete 
attempts made (table names). 
TotalGoodGuessesTablesNamesInDB Number of all correct 
autocompletes (table names). 
Table TotalRequests Total requests for the table (roll-
up of the next three methods). 
–TotalReqForName Total requests to get the full 
name (includes owner and table 
name, e.g. “owner.name”). 
–TotalReqForNumberOfColumns Total requests to find the number 
of columns in the table. 
–TotalReqForColumns Total requests to find all column 
names in the table. 
TotalGuessesForOwner Total autocomplete requests 
(owner portion of the full name). 
TotalGoodGuessesForOwner Total correct autocompletes 
(owner portion of the full name). 
TotalGuessesForName Total autocomplete requests 
(name portion of the full name). 
TotalGoodGuessesForName Total correct autocompletes 
(name portion of the full name). 
TotalGuessesForColumns Total requests for autocompleting 
the column names in this table. 
TotalGoodGuessesForColumns Total correct column name 
autocompletes in this table. 
Column TotalReqForName Total requests made to get the 
column name, including any 
autocomplete attempts. 
–TotalGuesses Total autocompletes attempted. 
–TotalGoodGuesses Total correct autocompletes. 
Bisection 
Output 
numOfRequests If it was an autocomplete, 
returns 1, otherwise returns 
count of the ASCII Byte Order 
(list of bytes used to find the 
current character). 
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 The BisectionOutput (BO) class is built to show the ASCII byte order used to 
find the current character, or track when an autocomplete attempt is made.  The 
autocomplete attempt is recorded, and if found correctly, populates the 
BisectionOutput.Found string part of the object.  This allows us to perform a few 
methods against the BO objects, such as DidWeGuess and DidWeGuessCorrectly, 
which are used in the statistical objects mentioned above. 
4.3  BCSQL Differences and Improvements 
4.3.1  BCSQL Differences Overview 
 BCSQL was written for Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL), referencing the 
system information tables instead of information schema.  Per the Microsoft 
developer network and MSSQL documentation: “Do not use 
INFORMATION_SCHEMA views to determine the schema of an object. The only 
reliable way to find the schema of an object is to query the sys.objects catalog 
view.” [32]  Therefore, the key objects used in BCSQL are sys.users to find the 
table owner, sysobjects for the table name, and syscolumns for the column names. 
Four differences were implemented in BCSQL for Blind SQL Injections: 
1. Sorting by length of the object names, which allows us know the 
minimum length of the next object without making requests to query the 
length for each object.  This keeps us from autocompleting smaller words 
once we know the length of last completed object. 
2. Tracking current owner and autocompleting it when discovering table 
objects in the database.  This allows us to reset the length and 
autocomplete word list when the owner changes. 
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3. Bisection rules check the upper ASCII ranges first, giving priority to the 
upper and lower case alphabetical ranges; if this check is false, then it 
does a NULL / end character request.  If not in the upper ASCII range or 
NULL, it checks numbers or underscore range, then for a space.  NULL 
checks for most other bisections go over the control character range from 
1 to 31, which is not used for schema objects, requiring other utilities to 
take seven requests to find NULL while BCSQL takes two. 
4. Autocomplete of words based from the dictionary file, which is built from 
the web crawler or added to by hand.  The concept is that web developers 
tend to use the same ID names as schema object names. 
These four concepts are the core to BCSQL usage and how it can provide 
improvements in the number of requests when compared against other blind 
injection tools. 
4.3.2  BCSQL Improvements In Detail 
 Table names in a database are unique by owner, and are referenced using 
“(sysusers.name)(dot)(sysobjects.name)”, such as dbo.Product, guest.Product, etc.  
While SQLMAP checks the current table against the previous table for the first few 
characters, BCSQL sorts by length of sysusers.name and sysobjects.name, in 
alphabetical order.  By doing this we can check if the current owner 
(sysusers.name) is the same, including the dot before the table name.  If the last 
known owner is guest, on the next object we would autocomplete the owner portion 
using the same owner.  This means we have found the first six characters 
(“guest.”) with one request, instead of the six requests done by SQLMAP.  
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The decision to sort table full names by both length of sysusers.name and 
sysobjects.name was also made so that we would know the length of the last found 
table name object.  Since it would take several requests to find the length of any 
object, BCSQL instead tracks the length of the last known sysobjects.name table 
name for the current owner, meaning, we do not keep track of the length of the 
owner and the dot after the owner’s name.  Thus we can use this in the 
autocomplete computation for minimum word completion length.  Column names in 
BCSQL are sorted by the length and then alphabetical order. 
 Bisection rules are slightly modified for BCSQL.  Instead of taking an exact 
bisection of cutting the sets in half, a few modified rules occur.  For alpha 
characters, the upper range (A-Z) is from (65-90) and the lower alpha range (a-z) 
is from (96-122).  All bisection checks start at greater than ASCII value 64.  If it is 
in the alpha range to start (>64), we check if it is in the lower alpha range (>96).  
If it is, we bisect into the middle of the lower alpha range (>109, or m).  If it is not, 
we bisect into middle of the upper alpha range (>77, or M). 
 If it is less than ASCII value 64 to start, we next check for NULL (<1).  This 
makes two checks for NULL, where as most programs would bisect to (<32, <16, 
<8, <4, <2, <1), which takes seven checks for NULL, or end of object name.  If it 
is not NULL, our next bisection check is in the number range (ASCII range for 
numbers 0-9 are 48-57), so we check at >47.  If it is greater than that, we bisect 
into >53 (which is 5).  If it is not in the number range, we make a special check for 
the SPACE character (ASCII 32), which is found in five requests.  Otherwise the list 
in bisected normally.  Therefore, instead of everything taking seven requests, NULL 
checks take two requests, spaces take five requests, and some other characters will 
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take six requests.  Some take six requests giving a tiny boost (for instance, the 
letter ‘A’ or ‘a’ would only take six requests). 
Lastly, we come to the autocomplete (AC) functions.  The AC functions are 
kicked off once we reach a minimum length, set in the app.config settings of the 
program.  They are passed in the string of the word we have so far, e.g. “Pas”, the 
minimum length to guess (determined by the sorting structures mentioned above), 
and a list of words already guessed (for columns and table names), as well as 
objects already known (resets for table names).  Recall that for columns, names are 
unique, but for tables, names are only unique by each owner, so we must reset 
known objects if the owner changes. 
BCSQL first finds the current character, and if the character count is greater 
than the setting to start using AC, it does one test.  If the test fails, it will find the 
next character before testing again.  It does the tests in alphabetical order from the 
dictionary. 
For instance, let us assume the following conditions in the program when 
searching for column names; word found so far: “Pas”, length of last word: 7, 
dictionary words starting with “Pas”:  Passed, Passport, Password.  When hitting the 
function, the word list would be trimmed to Passport and Password, since Passed is 
shorter than the current known length.  It would test for Passport, and fail, adding 
Passport to the list of guessed words (parameter 3).  After it finds the next 
character, it would pass in “Pass” to the function, and the only word left would be 
Password.  After autocompleting the object name correctly, it would set the length 
of last word to 8, add “Password” to the list of known words (parameter 4). 
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4.4  BCSQL Examples 
 BCSQL runs on the console with the default in INFO display mode.  This will 
display the progress without crowding up the screen.  If detailed payload data is 
needed, the app.config setting can be set to DEBUG.  In Figure 3 is an example of 
starting up the program with autocomplete running.  One can see it attempting the 
autocomplete of “Pro”, missing on that attempt, finding the next letter “d”, and 
then on the next autocomplete attempt it finds the correct word. 
 
Figure 3:  Sample of BCSQL Running - Console Output.  By default BCSQL displays 
the byte order of the requests as well as attempted autocompletes (ACs). 
 
 At the end of running BCSQL, each table is listed with the statistics from that 
table, including columns found, the total ACs attempted, along with total good ACs.  
These stats are shown for each column, and then a summary at the end of all the 
columns.  The total requests used for that table are also shown.  After all tables are 
displayed, the entire database statistics are shown, along with correctly completed 
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words, and the total requests from start until finish (including table and column 
counts), as can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4:  Database Statistics At End of Run.  This summary lists the requests made 
for each object, as well as correctly autocompleted words. 
 
 Before we compare BCSQL to SQLMAP in a database, here is a quick 
comparison of using BCSQL against the same database, with a dictionary file of one 
hundred ten database object names.  This dictionary file was built parsing against 
the sample ASPDOTNETSTOREFRONT (ASPDNSF) website and database. [33]  The 
ASPDNSF database has 149 table objects and 2,040 columns across those tables, 
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for a total of 2,189 objects in the database.  The total length of the objects, 
including the null character at the end, is 26,782 characters.  At seven requests per 
character, that would be 187,474 requests without any optimizations. The final 
statistics can be seen in Figure 5, saving us 47,300 requests, which is nearly 27% 
fewer requests than running without using the BCSQL AutoComplete feature.  
 
Figure 5:  Savings Using AutoComplete.  The total number of requests is 
significantly lower by utilizing the web scraped list and auto completion. 
 
 Even if the attempted ACs did not work, we would have only added 1,424 
requests.  Considering the savings of checking for NULL in BCSQL is two requests 
compared against other tools taking seven requests (for a savings of five requests 
per object), the savings made on the NULL check alone allow for up to five requests 
per schema before we start to lose any performance. 
 In Table 3, I make the comparison of SQLMAP, BCSQL without AC, and 
BCSQL with AC being used against a smaller database, using the same dictionary 
file in the previous tests.  Certain full table name request counts may seem higher 
than others; this is due to either BCSQL or SQLMAP switching owners, which gets 
rid of each tools’ optimization when finding the new owner in that circumstance.   
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Table 3:  Comparison of Requests for Objects Between Tools.  This lists the total 
requests made to the server to find the database schema’s object name. 
Owner.TableName Column Name SQLMAP 
BCSQL  
no AC 
BCSQL 
w/AC 
dbo.Product 
 
61 52 30 
 
Name 37 29 21 
 
ProductID 65 64 38 
 
Description 83 78 21 
 
(requests total) 246 223 110 
dbo.Customer 
 
91 60 24 
 
Fax 28 22 22 
 
Zip 28 23 23 
 
City 35 30 22 
 
Email 42 36 21 
 
Phone 42 37 22 
 
State 42 36 21 
 
Gender 49 42 42 
 
Street 49 44 44 
 
LastName 63 56 21 
 
Password 63 56 21 
 
FirstName 70 64 22 
 
CustomerID 77 72 23 
 
(requests total) 679 578 328 
dbo.Has Space 
 
75 62 62 
 
has.dot 56 49 49 
 
has,comma 70 66 66 
 
(requests total) 201 177 177 
guest.Short 
 
49 80 81 
 
data 27 27 27 
 
GuestID 59 50 50 
 
(requests total) 135 157 158 
guest.Product 
 
61 52 30 
 
Name 37 29 21 
 
ProductID 65 64 38 
 
Description 83 78 21 
 
(requests total) 246 223 110 
guest.DifferentUser 
 
141 94 94 
 
test 34 30 30 
 
customer 62 59 24 
 
(requests total) 237 183 148 
 
Total Requests: 1744 1541 1031 
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
If you know that a company develops similar sites for many clients, you can 
parse each site in the expectation that they may use similar backend objects.  This 
could provide the tool with a larger and smarter dictionary file.  When explaining 
my tool (and during assistance of proofreading), many programming colleagues 
have said that it is policy to name objects on the web the same as the database 
and that they are going to start recommending that their companies do things 
differently.  
5.1  Prevention 
 The only real protection against SQL Injection attacks is very carefully 
sanitized input.  Any data coming from an untrusted source should be treated with 
the utmost care, treated as unsafe, and any results being shown should be limited 
to what the end user needs to see.  Any unseen data, such as updates, inserts, 
deletes, or ability to be sent out-of-band, should be limited and audited.  There are 
a number of software plug-ins and hardware devices out there that try to assist 
with doing sanitization and limitation, but they are not foolproof, and people may 
find a work around for tool that you believe is protecting you.  Assume that you are 
not safe and consistently test on a regular schedule against injection attack vectors. 
The ultimate responsibility comes down to the developer. 
 Many papers are written for defending against injection attacks [8-13], but 
here is a summary of defensive coding for developers to use: [34]  
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• Parameterized Queries 
• Stored Procedures 
• Least Privilege 
• Escaping User Supplied Input 
• While List Input Validation 
 Parameterized queries are written into most languages, allowing you to 
define the type of input expected.  For instance, “test’ or ‘x’=’x” injected into a 
parameterized query as a user ID would actually look for an entire user ID 
matching that string.  This allows a separation of code and data.  These are often 
used in conjunction with stored procedures.  Parameterized queries may not protect 
against second-order injection attacks as discussed in chapter 2. 
 Stored procedures are database commands that take in parameters.  Thus 
they are like parameterized queries when it comes to taking in arguments, but the 
database language interpreter handles the separation of code and data instead of 
the front-end language interpreter. 
 It should be noted however that both parameterized queries and stored 
procedures can be unsafe if the stored procedure itself contains a dynamic query 
that is not sanitized!  Also, most databases do not allow table or column names or 
other code before the WHERE statement to be parameterized, resulting in the need 
of a dynamic query. [12] 
 Least privilege is an excellent idea no matter what type of system you are 
running.  One should never make the user connecting to the DBMS system 
administrator or root!  Creating different users with limited privileges helps protect 
the system.  This doesn’t stop the injection from happening, but may lower the 
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damage than can be caused due to injection.  It may not protect from second-order 
injections as well.  
 Escaping user-supplied input is a type of input validation, especially used 
when you need certain control characters such as a single quote.  For example, 
“O’Neil” may be a valid last name but could break a dynamically written query and 
cause an injection point.  Escaping the character uses other control characters, 
such as a second single quote or a backslash, to wrap the control character within 
the string.  However most languages allow other types of escaping, such as hex 
encoding or character concatenation, which can bypass escaping input strings.  
Therefore this is not recommended as the main type of protection, and one should 
use parameterized queries or stored procedures before using escaping, or at least 
along with escaping. 
 While list input validation is where you pass every SQL input through a 
function that sanitizes the input.  Due to the many types of encoding and many 
variations of user input, it should only be used in conjunction with parameterized 
queries and stored procedures.  It should not be used by itself, unless the input is 
very limited, such as a white list of only a few options (e.g. red or black are the 
only options and if any other text is detected, raise an error). 
 One thing I noticed while working on this thesis was the idea to use Unicode 
in schema object names.  Both SQLMAP and BCSQL did have issues with Unicode 
characters.  However, this would cause a huge problem with developers using the 
wrong names, not to mention making the code for future developers very difficult 
to read and program against.  It does not protect on tools using object IDs within a 
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database, such as Absinthe.  The only protection it provides is security through 
obfuscation, making it less human readable, as seen in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Obfuscation Through Unicode.  On the left we have the log results from 
SQLMAP, and on the right are the column names in SQL Management Studio. 
 
5.2  Improvements 
While we did see a strong performance increase using BCSQL, it performs 
best with the expectation of programmers using the same names in the web pages 
that are used in the database.  Larger dictionary files may help, but are not 
necessarily better.  We should monitor performance so that we are not making 
more than five auto complete attempts per object (our savings from the NULL 
check) if we want to stay on target with performance with other tools. 
 Using Markov Chains may assist on handling the auto completion, especially 
with developers and databases that use a lot of concatenated words using various 
types of casing routines (e.g. ShippingMethod, ShippingMethodID, ShippingWeight, 
etc.).  This would also be helpful in the case of partial word completion, such as for 
an object like ShippingMethodDestination.  Knowing the length of the last object 
and doing a test after getting “Shi” for “Shipping”, then finding the next few letters 
“Me” and test for “ShippingMethod”, and so on, would be possible using Markov 
Chains.  This would require statistical discovery and analysis against the dictionary 
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file, requiring the web crawler finding useful words, but would be an interesting 
approach to finding exceptionally long object names. 
 Lastly, support for other DBMS systems would be ideal, along with some of 
the other features found in other tools, like letting the web crawler find the injection 
point, handle more types of injection, etc.  BCSQL was developed as a proof of 
concept and works with the data at hand and will be open source for anyone to 
expand upon. 
5.3  Conclusion 
In conclusion, in practice BCSQL is ideal for websites with a Blind SQL 
Injection entry point.  The worst case may run longer than worst case of other tools 
if the dictionary files are cluttered with bad autocomplete names, but if that is the 
case, clear the dictionary file and rerun the web crawler, or run without using a 
dictionary file.  We should still see some savings alone from owner string 
completion, the improvement for NULL checks, and the bisection preferences.  
These small improvements give us the opportunity to do auto completion attempts 
without hurting overall performance, while giving us the opportunity to see a 
reduced set of requests against the server. 
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Appendix A Copyright Permissions 
 Below is the permission for the use of Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 is under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License.   
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/  
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Per this license, credit was given with links to each figure, and no changes were 
made.  Also per the CC BY-SA 3.0, I am providing a link to the owner’s license. 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Licenses#Licensing_of_OWASP_Website
_Content  
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